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One of the purposes cited for establishing the Bank of Japan (BOJ) was to
“facilitate finance” by promoting the nationwide integration of the regional
financial markets, which until that point had been divided and functioned
independently.
Nonetheless, much remains unknown about Japanese financial transac-
tions and the operations of the BOJ during the Meiji Period, and the role
the BOJ played in the process of domestic financial market integration is
still not sufficiently clear. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine, using interest rate data and
documentary evidence of financial transactions, the role played by the BOJ
in the process of financial market integration in Meiji Period Japan. 
The analysis finds that, from the perspective of reducing inter-regional
interest rate differences, there was indeed significant progress toward finan-
cial market integration in the latter half of the 1890s. It also finds that the
BOJ may have played a role in promoting financial market integration
because the expansion of its networks (a correspondent network with private-
sector banks and a branch office network) served to facilitate the movement
of funds between regions through the funds transfer services it provided.
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It has been argued that one of the purposes for establishing the Bank of Japan (BOJ)
was to promote the nationwide integration of the financial markets,
1 which until that
point had been divided and functioned independently. Regarding this point,
Yamamura (1970) provides a quantitative analysis of interest rates by prefecture
between 1889 and 1925 and finds that there was significant progress in the integration
of domestic Japanese financial markets up until about the end of the 19th century. 
In this regard, Tsurumi (1991) has performed a detailed documentary investigation
mainly from the perspectives of payments and markets, and found that beginning
around 1870 private financial institutions formed “spontaneous financial markets,” 
but with the establishment of the BOJ in 1882, financial markets began to integrate
and the BOJ began to replace private financial networks. Nonetheless, much remains
unknown about Japanese financial transactions and the operations of the BOJ during
the Meiji Period, and the role the BOJ played in the process of domestic financial 
market integration is not sufficiently clear. 
The purpose of this paper is to work from both the quantitative approach of
Yamamura (1970) and the documentary analysis of Tsurumi (1991) to analyze 
from new perspectives the role of the BOJ in the Meiji Period during the process of
financial market integration.
2 More specifically, this paper analyzes the interest rate
information that is commented upon in the descriptive sections of the Ministry of
Finance’s (MOF’s) Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance
to expand the data analysis to the 1881–88 period, which was not covered in Yamamura
(1970), and to examine from the perspectives of both the interest rate data and 
documentary evidence on financial transactions the role that the expanding BOJ 
network played in facilitating inter-regional payments and alleviating the regional 
disadvantage in funding. In doing this, I consider the BOJ network to consist of 
(1) the correspondent transactions between the BOJ and private-sector financial 
institutions, and (2) the branches and local offices of the the BOJ. The analysis 
organizes and exploits data on prefectural interest rates and BOJ correspondent 
transactions found in the Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of
Finance, the Imperial Statistics Yearbook and the Manuals and Rules of the Bank of
Japan’s Operations. In addition, I examine recently released documents from the Bank
of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives and from the Mitsui
Bunko archives. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section II refers to prior research to discuss the
integration of financial markets and the BOJ’s involvement. Section III focuses on
BOJ correspondent transactions and the establishment of local branches and represen-
tative offices in rural areas to examine the process by which the finance and payments
network expanded in the 1870s and beyond. Section IV turns to local interest rate
trends to examine the process by which domestic financial markets integrated under
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1. Matsukata (1958). 
2. It would presumably be useful for an analysis of the financial market integration process to investigate the
commodities markets as well, because commodities distribution will provide important perspectives. However, this
paper focuses only on the financial markets.this financial and payments network. It also considers the role played by the BOJ 
network in domestic financial market integration from a variety of vantage points.
Section V summarizes the findings and identifies issues for future research.
II. Review of Prior Research on the Relationship between
Financial Markets and the BOJ 
Ishii (2001)
3 discusses the research into BOJ history done after World War II, when
empirical studies of Japanese financial history and its relevance to Japanese financial
history studies as a whole were attracting attention from scholars. According to Ishii,
the analytical perspectives were, in order of appearance: (1) the shift from the institu-
tional to the functional approach;
4 (2) the “history of industrial finance” approach;
5
(3) the financial markets and payment system approach;
6 and (4) the monetary 
policy history approach.
7 He notes the need for research using the comparative and
correlative history approach in future research. 
Focusing on the “financial markets and payment system approach” that is deeply
related to the fundamental objective of this paper, I analyze the impact on financial
markets of the expansion in the BOJ’s networks in the form of its local representatives
and correspondent transactions network. Many studies find the integration of 
financial markets
8 to have taken place between the 1890s and early 1900s. Some of
the studies also point out the importance of focusing on the development of the 
BOJ’s correspondent transaction network and branch and local office network when
investigating financial market integration. 
To identify the period of nationwide integration of financial markets, Yamamura
(1970) focuses on the period between 1889 and 1925 and performs a quantitative
analysis that uses deposit and lending interest rates by prefecture. He finds that 
the interest rate divergence among prefectures declined substantially by the end of 
the 19th century and concludes that during this time significant progress was made
toward nationwide market integration.
9 Okada (1966) analyzes the relationship 
during the latter half of the Meiji Period about from 1890 to 1912 between lending
and deposit rates in Tokyo, Osaka, and nationwide (in 20 major cities) and the BOJ
official discount rate. He concludes that the “integrated financial markets’ initial stage”
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3. See Ishii (2001, p. 4).
4. The shift that appeared in the 1950s from analysis of the institutional aspects of the BOJ to its functional aspects of,
for example, industrial finance (see Ishii [2001, pp. 4–5]). 
5. Research from the 1960s to the mid-1970s that focused on the role of the BOJ in supplying funding to industries
(see Ishii [2001, pp. 5–8]). 
6. Research that began around the mid-1970s and focused on the importance of financial market functions (see Ishii
[2001, pp. 8–10]). 
7. Research into BOJ monetary policy that began to become more common in the 1980s (see Ishii [2001, pp. 10–12]). 
8. The scope of the analysis differs across studies in terms of the financial markets. For example, Tsurumi (1991) 
discusses the “integration period” in terms of the lending market, deposit market, and call market, whereas Yamamura
(1970) discusses it in terms of the lending market and deposit market only. In this paper, we analyze lending 
interest rates because data are available from a comparatively early period.
9. “The 1890s were the most important period in the process by which integrated capital markets emerged in Japan.
Japan had extremely integrated, modern capital markets even prior to the end of the Russo-Japanese war” (Yamamura
[1970, p. 67]). was in the first decade of the 20th century, when there was nationwide integration of
the official discount rate.
10 Okada (2001) focuses on the importance of the correspon-
dent transaction network for private banks and concludes that “although in the initial
stages, integrated, nationwide financial markets were formed...at the beginning of
the 1900s.”
11 Tsurumi (1991) indicates that “spontaneous private financial markets”
existed prior to the establishment of the BOJ, but domestic Japanese financial markets
were not linked to each other. Therefore when the BOJ was established these “sponta-
neous private financial markets” were transformed into a single market with the BOJ
at its core.
12 Turning to the integration of financial markets, he finds that the divisions
between the Tokyo and Osaka financial markets had more or less disappeared by the
early 1890s, but “geographical separation” remained in other regions.
13 In addition,
Tsurumi (1981) refers to the rapid decline in interest rates that took place between
1907 and 1912 as an “interest rate revolution,” and notes that the previously wide 
differences in interest rate levels between different regions of the country were reduced
and flattened at this time. He points out that a wide-area funding network began to
form between the cities and the rural areas, and this network could be termed a
“nationwide financial market.”
14
Several scholars, however, also express reservations about Meiji Period financial
market integration. One example is Asakura (1988), who provides an overview of
financial history since the Meiji Period. His study finds large differences in interest
rates between the cities and the rural areas in the period between 1897 and 1906. 
The tendency was still for rates to be lower in the major cities and higher in rural
cities,
15 although interest rate levels generally declined between 1907 and 1912.
Teranishi (2003) finds a rapid decline in the coefficient of variation between pre-
fectural minimum deposit interest rates between 1894 and 1898. However, while
minimum rates converged around 1900, the differences in maximum deposit interest
rates began to expand once again after a temporary convergence at around the same
time and did not re-converge until the end of the 1930s. In light of the fact that 
minimum deposit interest rates were those charged by the major banks while 
maximum deposit interest rates were charged by the small and medium-sized banks
without a nationwide network, Teranishi concludes, “While a nationwide market 
had formed among the major banks with nationwide funding networks by around
1900, in the rural areas financial markets retained their local character.”
16 Okazaki
(1993) uses data on the banking transactions of individual enterprises and people in
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10. Okada (1966, p. 149). 
11. Okada (2001, p. 68). 
12. Tsurumi (1991, p. 152) says, “The Bank of Japan...served as the nationwide monetary regulator and therefore
established a broad domestic correspondent transaction network. The BOJ’s domestic funds transfer transactions
were unique because of its position as a central bank. The domestic funds transfer market expanded and changed
rapidly after the opening of ports, and the Bank came to serve literally as its backbone. The funds transfer 
clearinghouses in the three major cities had emerged as spontaneous organizations to provide adjustments on the
back of the rapid expansion of domestic funds transfer transactions, but they were replaced by Bank of Japan 
correspondent transactions.”
13. Tsurumi (1991, p. 239). See (Tsurumi [1991, p. 152]) for a description of “geographical separation.” He does not
provide a clear description of when the integration of financial markets was completed.
14. Tsurumi (1981, pp. 6–8). 
15. Asakura (1988, p. 339). 
16. Teranishi (2003, p. 106).seven Kanto-area prefectures to find that there were separations of transactions in
terms of both geographical location and the size of banks in 1917, indicating that 
little progress had been made in the integration of local financial markets.
17
To sum up prior research from the viewpoint of the factors that promoted the 
integration of financial markets, there is no consensus opinion so far on the factors
which promote integration of financial markets. While factors stressed as the causes 
of market integration differ across studies, most underscore the importance of the
contributions made by both the expanding public and private sectors’ financial and
payments network to the integration of financial markets.
18
Okada (2001) focuses on networks in the private sector and finds a clear correlation
between the process by which the internal funds transfer arrangements developed into
interbank transactions and the development of the branch bank system in the early
Meiji Period. The development of the branch bank system,
19 the expansion of funds
transfer services and the increase in correspondent transaction contracts, he argues,
contributed significantly to the improvement and enhancement of banking services 
in the middle and late Meiji Period. He insists, “The development of funds transfer
services, in other words, ‘the expansion of the correspondent transaction network,’
was expected to alleviate the unconnected and unintegrated financial structure of 
the early Meiji Period, link what had so far been isolated national banks and spur 
the development of financial markets. In other words, it was to ‘facilitate finance.’”
20
On the other hand, the early Meiji
21 credit system was still “immature,” and “functions
providing funds transfer services developed them as internal services between the head
and branch offices.”
22 Because of this, private bank funds transfer services primarily
utilized internal network (branches) rather than transactions with other banks.
Tsurumi (1991) emphasizes the role played by the private correspondent transaction
networks: “Between 1877 and 1880, major urban banks built nationwide branch and
correspondent networks due to the impetus provided by two factors, the handling of
government funds and the distribution of commodities. This movement, combined
with efforts to create correspondent networks among major local banks in the trading
centers for the distribution of old and new local specialty products, led to building the
foundation for a nationwide correspondent network.”
23 Teranishi (1982) highlights
the major contributions that better transportation and communications networks
made to the development of the private correspondent transaction networks.
24
Turning to correspondent transactions between the BOJ and private financial
institutions, Okada (2001) states, “It is impossible to be clear and specific about the
role played by correspondent contracts with the Bank of Japan in achieving the initial
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17. Okazaki (1993, pp. 306–307).
18. Bank of Japan (1982) looks at the expansion of the BOJ correspondent transaction network and the opening of
BOJ branches since its establishment primarily in terms of the supply of funds through funds transfer services 
and bill discounting services. 
19. For research into the significance of the development of the branch bank system, see Asai (1978). 
20. Okada (2001, p. 68). 
21. Okada (2001) does not provide a specific year. 
22. Okada (2001, p. 4). 
23. Tsurumi (1991, p. 107). With regard to “old and new local specialty products,” Tsurumi defines silk thread, tea,
and rice, and others; however, he does not provide a clear definition of which belongs to which. 
24. See Teranishi (1982, pp. 214–219).goal of facilitating finance at this stage (the early Meiji Period).”
25 In contrast, Tsurumi
(1991) insists, “The Bank of Japan concentrated on building a correspondent trans-
action network that would tie together the national banks, which were spread out
among the regions, and it did so in a way that did not compete with the national
banks.”
26 He recognizes that the BOJ did indeed enhance the correspondent network
with private banks and at the same time points to the limits inherent in the corre-
spondent network itself,
27 noting, “No matter how many domestic funds transfer 
systems operated by the BOJ were commonly used, they were not able to supplant the
activities of local representatives.”
28
Tsurumi (1991) considers the role that the BOJ local representatives played in the
integration of financial markets, taking the Osaka Branch as an example. Both the
Head Office and the Osaka Branch discounted and purchased bills between Tokyo
and Osaka, which Tsurumi says “virtually alleviated the remaining separations
between the Tokyo and Osaka financial markets.”
29 Imuta (1980) and Ishii (1980) 
discuss slightly later analytical periods and also emphasize the merits to local banks
when there was a BOJ local representative in the same prefecture. For example, Imuta
(1980) finds that the opening of a BOJ local representative in the same prefecture
enabled the local banks to deal directly with the BOJ if they were allowed to make a
contract with a BOJ local representative. This, he argues, facilitated the inflow and
outflow of funds among regions reflecting the relative levels of local financing demand
and also increased the convenience to local banks of accepting BOJ credits.
30 Ishii
(1980) points out that whether there was a BOJ local representative in the same 
prefecture was a “decisive factor in having transactions with the Bank of Japan”
31 for
comparatively small-scale local banks. 
III. The Financial and Payments Network and the Role of the BOJ
This section builds on the prior research overviewed in the previous section to examine
the expansion of the financial and payments network around the time of the establish-
ment of the BOJ, the core focus of this paper, and to observe the role that it played in
the integration of financial markets. 
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25. Okada (2001, p. 25). The author goes on to say, “The impact [of the expansion of the BOJ correspondent network]
on the formation and expansion of financial markets, together with ‘joint transfers’ [explained later], about which
we still do not know much, remain issues that will require further verification” (Okada [2001, p. 68]). 
26. Tsurumi (1991, p. 103). 
27. Regarding the limits to the ineffectiveness of correspondent transactions in terms of enhancing financial market
integration, Tsurumi (1991) says, “While the Bank of Japan correspondent network was effective in facilitating
transfers between remote areas, banks located outside of Tokyo and Osaka were basically unable to avail themselves
of the Bank of Japan’s immediate bill re-discounting and current account overdraft services, creating the need to
open Bank of Japan local representatives” (Tsurumi [1991, p. 152]). 
28. Tsurumi (1991, p. 152). 
29. Tsurumi (1991, pp. 238–239). 
30. Imuta (1980, p. 52) says that “the switch from correspondent transactions to current account overdrafts that
resulted from the opening of Bank of Japan local representatives in the same prefecture presumably increased the
convenience with which Bank of Japan credits could be accepted.” He also emphasizes the importance to private
banks of transactions with the BOJ not only for funds transfers but also to take advantage of the convenience of
current account overdrafts, and so on (see Imuta [1980, pp. 50–52]). 
31. Ishii (1980, p. 136). The years immediately before and after the establishment of the BOJ can be broken
down into three periods from the perspective of the enhancement of the financial and
payments network: 
(1) 1870s: expansion of private financial institution networks 
(2) 1880s: expansion of correspondent transactions between the BOJ and private
financial institutions 
(3) 1890s: expansion of the BOJ local representatives (branches, local offices, etc.) 
Figure 1 illustrates trends for measurements of private financial institution and
BOJ networks. According to the figure, there was a rapid increase in the number of
bank head and branch offices in the late 1870s, the impetus for which came from the
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Number of correspondent contracts between private banks (left scale) 
Sum of head offices and branches of private banks (left scale)
Number of correspondent contracts between the BOJ and private banks 
(units of 10, right scale)
Number of prefectures with the BOJ (right scale)
Note: The numbers of correspondent contracts between private banks are 
available only for 1877, 1879, and 1880. Numbers of banks represent total
national banks and private banks. 
Sources: The numbers of correspondent contracts between private banks come
from the Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of
Finance; the numbers of correspondent contracts between the BOJ 
and private banks come from the Manuals and Rules of the Bank 
of Japan’s Operations Collection 1, Volume 2; the numbers of BOJ
branches and offices come from The Bank of Japan: The First Hundred
Years: Materials; and the numbers of banks come from the Annual
Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance and Japanese
Monetary Statistics (Goto [1970]).1876 amendments to the National Banks Ordinance that led to the establishment of 
a series of national banks.
32 In addition to the head and branch office networks of
national banks, and so on, there was a sharp rise in the number of correspondent 
transactions as represented by the funds transfer contract signed between these 
financial institutions. By 1880, the number of such contracts exceeded 1,000. When
it was established in 1882, the BOJ had two offices: the Head Office in Tokyo and 
the Osaka Branch. It focused on correspondent transactions with private financial 
institutions in the building of its network, and by around 1890 had signed 150 corre-
spondent transaction contracts with private financial institutions. During the next
decade, the BOJ expanded its local branch and representative offices, and other
offices, so that by 1900 it had 10 branches and local offices in seven prefectures. 
I examine this history in more detail to confirm my hypothesis that the expansion
of the BOJ network and consequent facilitation of remote payments alleviated the
regional disadvantage in funding. 
A. 1870s: Expansion of Private Financial Institution Networks 
The dozen or so years between the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and the establishment of
the BOJ in 1882 are a time during which Japan conducted many experiments with
the financial and payment systems, often referring to foreign and other systems as
models. It was at this time that many of the core financial institutions were estab-
lished, including the exchange firms,
33 the national banks, and the Yokohama Specie
Bank,
34 as well as a number of private banks
35 and quasi-banks.
36 These new financial
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32. National banks are based on national law and private banks on fact. The government issued the National Banks
Ordinance in 1872 for the purpose of establishing a system to collect and convert the large volumes of currency
that had been issued. The ordinance also aimed to reinforce financial functions, particularly the supply of funding
for industrial and commercial development. Banks established under this ordinance are referred to as “national
banks.” Initially four national banks were established, and they issued currency that was convertible for gold.
Amendments to the Ordinance in 1876, however, lifted the requirement of gold conversion, making it easier to
establish national banks. The result was a sharp increase in the number of national banks and a corresponding
increase in outstanding national bank notes (see Bank of Japan [1982, pp. 25–29]).
33. The exchange firms were established in 1869 at the request of the government. Their primary business was exchange
services and their funding came from investments by wealthy merchants and loans from the government. Exchange firms
were established in Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Yokohama, Kobe, Niigata, Otsu, and Tsuruga. In addition to exchange 
services, they issued convertible notes and made loans. The lack of requirements to maintain reserves against specie issues
resulted in rampant over-issuing, and when the government began to impose reserve ratio requirements, results deteri-
orated and the exchange firms were disbanded (see Tamaki [1994, pp. 18–20] and Bank of Japan [1982, pp. 12–16]).
Ishii (2003) examines the commonly held view that domestic funds transfers dwindled after the disbanding of the
exchange firms and finds that in fact the exchange merchants who participated in the establishment of exchange firms
were at the same time providing domestic funds transfer services which were separate from those of the exchange firms. 
34. The Yokohama Specie Bank was a foreign exchange bank that opened in 1880. The plan was for gold to be 
accumulated and specie banknotes issued by this bank, but this was not achieved (see Bank of Japan [1982, 
pp. 71–75]). 
35. The first private bank to be established was the Mitsui Bank Private Company in 1876. According to Asakura
(1988), many applications were filed during the early Meiji Period for the establishment of banks, but the govern-
ment did not permit private banks to be established because of its intention to establish national banks. Private
bank establishment did not, therefore, begin in earnest until 1880, after the number of national banks had 
reached a ceiling in 1879. During the 10 or so years beginning with 1877, private banks were established by the
money changers of the Edo Period Shogunate and by relatively wealthy merchants and landlords. Most of the 
private banks were initially established in major cities (Tokyo, Osaka), Yokohama, and Kobe, where external trade
was active or in areas such as Niigata, Miyagi, Shizuoka, Fukushima, and Nagano that produced commodities such
as rice, tea, and silk thread. The highest capitalized private bank was Mitsui Bank at ¥2 million; and at the other
end of the scale were numerous banks capitalized at around ¥10,000 (see Asakura [1988, pp. 51–52]). 
36. “Quasi-banks” refers to institutions that were established spontaneously beginning in the early Meiji Period 
and provided funds transfer, exchange, lending, and deposit-taking services. Their average capital was extremelyinstitutions began to form networks to adjust their mutual funding surpluses and
shortfalls. The networks connecting private-sector financial institutions to each other
developed rapidly after the National Banks Ordinance was amended in 1876 and 
substantially relaxed the conditions for establishing national banks. In 1880, there
were 150 private-sector banks (including national banks and private banks, excluding
quasi-banks) with 254 head and branch offices and 1,027 correspondent contracts
between private-sector banks.
37
According to Tsurumi (1991), the postal funds transfer system that began in 1875
provided the first means of transferring funds between remote areas, but from around
1877 bank transfers became the primary means of doing so. Looking at the domestic
funds transfer market in more detail, I find that between 1877 and 1880 branch office
networks and correspondent networks were built between the major urban banks 
and the large regional banks, and these networks were used to provide funds transfer
services.
38 In Tokyo, Osaka, and other centers, transfer clearinghouses began to be
spontaneously organized by around 1879 and 1880, and served as a venue for trading
transfers between banks.
39 However, Tokyo-Osaka transfers were the focus of the 
correspondent network, and only a few of the largest regional banks were able to 
participate in the network at all, so some regions remained at a disadvantage. To
reduce this bias, there was a “systematic attempt to link national and private banks in
different areas of the country.”
40 The result was the “joint transfer” project
41 that tried
to build a multilayer correspondent network led by the large regional banks. Under
the project, the Kyushu Banking Federation did in fact create a “joint transfer” system
in 1880. Taking advantage of the centralized payment functions required expanding
the scope of participants from the regional to the national level, so in 1883 the
Kyushu Banking Federation requested the BOJ, Tokyo Banking Association, and
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small compared to the national and private banks. These firms “were established in areas where national and 
private banks did not adequately supply funds; only three were established in Tokyo and Osaka combined”
(Tamaki [1994, pp. 41–42]). The Banking Ordinance that took effect in July 1893 forced bank-like companies 
to choose between going out of business, converting to banks, or merging, and effectively put an end to these
firms. One can observe a corresponding doubling of the number of banks in 1893 (see Asakura [1988, pp. 18–20,
p. 56]). 
37. See Banking Division Report No. 1 (First Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance), 
pp. 131–136; Banking Bureau Report No. 2 (Second Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of
Finance), pp. 100–150. 
38. See Tsurumi (1991, pp. 117–118). 
39. Little is known about transfer clearinghouses because of the paucity of documents remaining, but it is 
assumed that the Osaka transfer clearinghouse provided “trading in Tokyo transfers” and “inter-bank funds 
lending/borrowing” (see Tsurumi [1991, pp. 130–143]). Tsurumi (1991) focuses on the fact that domestic 
transfers were “traded” rather than “exchanged” to hypothesize that while the offsetting of transfers was the 
primary function of transfer clearinghouses, they also served as a means of short-term investment (see Tsurumi
[1991, p. 135]). 
40. Tsurumi (1991, p. 107). 
41. The Osaka Bank Report contains a description of this point that says, “Federation banks will have lead offices in
Tokyo and Osaka and handling offices in Hakodate, Sendai, Niigata, Nagoya, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and other
locations, and other banks will connect with these handling offices according to their region” (Osaka Banking
Association [1957, pp. 1192–1203]). The “joint transfer scheme” was proposed by Juhachi Bank (18th Bank),
which was located in Nagasaki Prefecture, as a “policy for expanding transfers” at the time the Kyushu Banking
Federation was established in 1880. What the “policy” envisioned was a nationwide, centralized transfer payments
mechanism in which, for example, the credit/debit relationship existing between a bank in Hirado (in Nagasaki
Prefecture) and a bank in Hachinohe (in Aomori Prefecture) as the result of a funds transfer would be settled by
credit/debit transfers at lead offices in Osaka and Tokyo via upper-level branches of money center banks in
Nagasaki and Sendai (see Tsurumi [1991, pp. 107–108]). Osaka Banking Association to join it. The negotiations were unsuccessful,
42 but joint
transfer schemes expanded to different parts of the country. In 1900, a mechanism
was set up whereby the joint exchange groups scattered around Japan were joined
together by private correspondent networks in Tokyo and Osaka.
43,44 As can be seen
from this discussion, these networks were spontaneous, self-directed private-sector-
level networks, and there were limits to the number of participants they could attract
and the functions they could deliver. 
B. 1880s: Expansion of Correspondent Transactions between the BOJ and
Private Financial Institutions 
The momentum built for the establishment of the BOJ between 1880 and 1881. 
One of the chief purposes of its establishment was to provide Japan with a conversion
system,
45 but proponents also emphasized its duties to smooth out the supply of
funds, reduce interest rates, and create uniform, nationwide financial markets. The
“Proposal to Establish the Bank of Japan” was submitted in 1882 in the name of
Masayoshi Matsukata, the Minister of Finance. According to the proposal and 
supporting documentation entitled “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank 
of Japan,”
46 there were five objectives related to the BOJ’s establishment: (1) facilita-
tion of finance; (2) enhancement of the funding of the financial institutions such as
national banks; (3) reduction of interest rates; (4) treasury receipt and disbursement
services; and (5) discounting of foreign bills. Of these purposes, the first three were
related to the enhancement of domestic financial intermediation functions and funds
payment functions, and the first is particularly relevant to my discussion of the BOJ
network. According to the “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan,”
the first purpose, “facilitation of finance,” was based on a judgment that networks of
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42. According to the Osaka Bank Report, the banking association replied, “This proposal needs to be considered as 
an exceedingly expedient means of linking finance throughout the country and expanding the collection and 
dispersion of prices. However, given the exceeding importance of this matter, the question of whether it should be
expanded nationwide requires further deliberation.” The BOJ responded, “This appears to be an exceedingly expe-
dient proposal and should be given a response after full deliberation once we have finished the press 
of business for the amendment of the Banking Ordinance” (Osaka Banking Association [1957, pp. 1192–1203]). 
On this point, Tsurumi (1991) says that the opposition of the Tokyo and Osaka banking associations was 
because “the lead branches in eastern and western Japan would provide the payments axis and would profit 
from the accumulation of large volumes of transfer funds, but would also see a concentration of complex and
time-consuming clerical work. What is more, the burdens for performing this work were considered to be natural
‘obligations’ that the branches undertook in return for this accumulation of funds, and the fees were kept low as a
result.” The BOJ’s opposition stemmed from the fact that “it had a policy of building a nationwide correspondent
network between the BOJ and major banks in the urban and rural areas and controlling these through its nation-
wide correspondent network created from the above private-sector transfer and payment schemes, i.e., the regional
‘joint transfer’ networks, which separately spread in the east and west and the private correspondent networks
formed by major urban banks in Tokyo and Osaka” (Tsurumi [1991, pp. 113–114]). 
43. See Tsurumi (1991, p. 113). 
44. Okada (2001, p. 34) says that the joint transfer scheme “extended only to Tohoku, Hokkaido, Chugoku, Shikoku,
and Kyushu regions and lacked the centers of Tokyo and Osaka.”
45. The BOJ was not initially authorized to issue banknotes. The “Proposal to Establish the Bank of Japan” allowed 
it to consolidate convertible banknotes, but there was a wide spread between the value of silver coins and 
inconvertible banknotes and it was feared that if the BOJ were to issue notes convertible for specie, they would 
be immediately converted and not circulate. It was therefore decided that the policy would be for the BOJ to 
accumulate reserves of specie and that specific rules regarding the issuing of convertible banknotes would be 
formulated when issuing became possible (see Bank of Japan [1982, p. 280]). 
46. Submitted to Prime Minister Sanetomi Sanjo, requesting “a speedy decision on the proposal to establish the BOJ
and promulgation of the ordinance.” (See Bank of Japan [1958a, p. 990, and 1982, p. 120].) private-sector financial institutions alone were insufficient to adjust funding surpluses
and shortfalls between regions.
47 It was therefore necessary for the central bank to sign 
correspondent contracts with national banks throughout the country to serve as the
core for financial intermediation and to unify local financial markets into a single,
nationwide market.
48 As can be seen from this point, the use of correspondent transac-
tions to build a network between the BOJ and private-sector financial institutions was
considered to be a powerful tool for the achievement of the initial objectives behind
the BOJ’s establishment. 
The details of the correspondent system are observed in the boilerplate for a corre-
spondent transaction
49 found in Collection 1, Volume 2 of the Manuals and Rules of
the Bank of Japan’s Operations. This contract was to be signed between the BOJ and
private-sector financial institutions (excerpts below): 
•The Bank of Japan engages in transfer transactions, commercial bill transac-
tions, collection services and temporary lending services with banks with
which it has signed correspondent contracts (Article 1). 
•The Bank of Japan establishes ceiling amounts for loans to individual banks
in order to engage in transfer transactions, commercial bill transactions, 
collection services and temporary lending services (Article 2). 
•Individual banks shall deposit security with the Bank of Japan (Article 3). 
•The value of the bills issued by individual banks through the Bank of Japan
shall be no more than the individual bank’s credit balance (Article 4). 
•Funds transfers shall be payable on sight (Article 8). 
•In the event that a bank requests a temporary loan, the Bank of Japan may, at
its discretion, loan an amount up to one-third the lending ceiling (Article 10). 
•Credit and debit accounts shall be settled on the last days of May and
November (Article 12). 
The BOJ required permission from the Minister of Finance prior to signing 
correspondent transactions with a private-sector financial institution.
50
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47. The “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan” says, “Regarding the present status of national banks,
they stand in geographical confrontation to one another and have little desire to communicate or coordinate.
Indeed, they move in opposition to one another and check one another. Should one bank have a surplus, it is not
able to use that surplus to cover shortfalls in another bank.” (See Bank of Japan [1958a, p. 993].) 
48. The “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan” says, “The establishment of a central bank at this
time would enable the sound national banks in various regions to be treated as the BOJ’s local representatives, with
‘correspondence’ contracts signed so as to open the first nationwide channels for the circulation of money...
A central bank would play a key role in providing financial channels, observing the degree of activity of nationwide
commerce and money transfers so that money surplus in one region could be transferred to the financial needs of
another region, and the money surplus of that region could be lent for the financial needs of the first region. This
movement and circulation would be akin to the heart pumping blood through the arteries to the limbs to enable
them to move. Doing this would, for the first time, enable the volume of money to be smoothed out so that the
national finances would no longer suffer from clogging and blockage.” (See Bank of Japan [1958a, p. 994].) 
49. The material titled “The Bank of Japan and xxx Bank sign this contract in witness of a good-faith decision of 
both parties to enter into ‘correspondence’ transactions pursuant to Article 2 of the Bank of Japan Charter and with
the permission of the Minister of Finance” (Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations, Collection 1,
Volume 2, pp. 675–679).
50. Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations, Collection 1, Volume 2, p. 615. From the contract boilerplate described above, it can be seen that private-sector
banks that signed correspondent transactions were able to use the BOJ to transfer
funds and collect bills to and from remote locations and were also able to enjoy 
temporary loans from the BOJ provided that collateral had been put up.
51
The BOJ began to sign correspondent transactions with private-sector banks in
June 1883, opening up a means of transferring funds through the BOJ in addition to
private payment systems. Kasuya (2000) comments that “going through the Bank of
Japan helped to smooth out the movement of funds between remote locations.”
52 On
the other hand, the initiation of BOJ correspondent transactions also had the effect 
of reducing handling volumes of the transfer clearinghouses that served as the fund
payment vehicles for the private sector.
53
Collection 1, Volume 2 of the Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations
contains a list
54 of private-sector banks’ offices that had signed contracts with the BOJ
for “correspondence” transactions together with the years in which correspondent 
contracts began and ended for each individual office. I calculate the number of corre-
spondent contracts during the years 1883–1909 from this list (Figure 1). One can see
that there was a sharp rise immediately after the BOJ began to sign correspondent 
contracts in June 1883,
55 with the number of contracts going from 55 in 1883 to 133
in 1884. Later, from the latter half of the 1880s to the early 1890s, the number 
hovered at around 150. Then when the Banking Ordinance
56 took effect in 1893, there
was a rise in the number of private-sector banks that in turn fueled an increase in the
number of correspondent contracts in the late 1890s. Contracts peaked at 239 in 1900. 
However, as will be discussed below, the records of the times indicate that even in
the late 1880s, when significant progress had been made in the erection of a correspon-
dent network between the BOJ and private-sector financial institutions, there had still
been little headway made on the nationwide integration of financial markets. 
C. 1890s: Expansion of the BOJ Local Representatives
57
1. Policies of the MOF and BOJ on the establishment of the BOJ local representatives 
As discussed above, in the 1880s the emphasis was on the correspondent network
aspect of the BOJ network, but in the 1890s the focus shifted to the expansion of
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51. Correspondent contracts were signed on a branch office basis, not on a financial institution basis. For example, in 1883
Mitsui Bank had seven branch offices in Hachioji, Odawara, Nagoya, Aomori, and other locations that signed con-
tracts with the BOJ’s Head Office, while its Otsu office signed a contract with the BOJ’s Osaka Branch. In other words,
at this point in time, Mitsui Bank had eight correspondent contracts with the BOJ (see Bank of Japan [1982, p. 329]). 
52. Kasuya (2000, p. 136). 
53. “Bank of Japan correspondent transactions certainly had a negative impact on the activities of the transfer
clearinghouses...The functions of the transfer clearinghouses were gradually swallowed up and replaced by the
expansion of BOJ correspondent transfers” (Tsurumi [1991, p. 151]). 
54. Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations, Collection 1, Volume 2, pp. 695–709. 
55. Banks (national banks, private banks) at the time did not have a large number of branch offices, and indeed some had
no branch offices at all. Throughout the Meiji Period, the average was approximately one branch office per bank. 
56. Article 1 of the Banking Ordinance provides this definition: “Any entity that engages in the discounting of 
securities, funds transfer services, or has both deposit-taking services and lending services as a business in 
publicly opened offices shall be deemed a bank regardless of the name under which said services are provided”
(Meiji Period Fiscal History Editing Committee [1905, pp. 594–597]). 
57. The BOJ’s offices consist of the Head Office, branches, local offices, representative offices, and agencies. The Head
Office, branches, and local offices were established and run by the BOJ. The representative offices and agencies are
private-sector banks, which were commissioned to serve as the BOJ. I call offices located in local areas altogether
“local representatives.” local services in the form of either a branch or local office. One of the factors behind
this was presumably a change in the MOF policy regarding the BOJ network during
this period of time. 
The BOJ’s network was seen as a means of “facilitating finance,” but at the time of
the BOJ’s establishment the MOF was concerned that “the establishment of BOJ’s
local representatives might ‘impair the operations of local ordinary banks,’ and the
BOJ should therefore ‘initially’ sign correspondent contracts rather than establishing
branch offices.”
58 This was presumably why the BOJ began by developing a nation-
wide correspondent network as a channel for circulating funds.
59 However, the MOF’s
policy appears to have changed in the latter half of the 1880s. According to docu-
ments in the Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives,
BOJ Governor Shigetoshi Yoshihara applied to Minister of Finance Masayoshi
Matsukata to establish new branches on June 16, 1886.
60 The application begins by
noting the need to closely monitor conditions in local areas: “There has been a signifi-
cant increase in the Bank’s operations with respect to its duties of handling treasury
receipts and disbursements, issuing convertible banknotes and providing ‘correspon-
dence’ services, and these services now extend throughout the country. I therefore
believe it is necessary and urgent to more closely monitor local conditions and 
circumstances.” Having done this, the application notes, “However, the Bank only has
one branch office in Osaka and engages in ‘correspondence’ financial transactions
with national and private banks in other parts of the country and must rely on their
communications through correspondent transactions to confirm the ebbs and flows of
local commerce and finance to report to the Bank of Japan’s Head Office.” In other
words, correspondent transactions with private-sector financial institutions are,
according to the application, insufficient for responding to changes in local financial
and economic circumstances. It then argues that the establishment of “branch offices
in local centers” would “facilitate finance and balance
61 interest rates.”
62 Minister of
Finance Matsukata approved the application on June 23,
63 which led to a series of
branch and local offices being opened by the BOJ in the 1890s.
64
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58. Tsurumi (1991, p. 96). “Bank of Japan Ordinance” (Bill No. 330) first reading; see Minutes of the Upper House,
Volume 12, p. 526. 
59. “The Bank of Japan did not have a local representatives’ network where there was fear of encroaching upon the base
of operations for national banks. Instead, it signed correspondent contracts with powerful local banks, enabling it
to overcome the isolation of the national banks and achieve nationwide control” (Tsurumi [1991, p. 114]). 
60. “Application to the Minister of Finance to Increase Branches” (Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and
Economic Studies Archives, Document A3681). 
61. When the BOJ was established, Matsukata commented in “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of
Japan” on both the alleviation of regional disparities in interest rates and the alleviation of seasonal fluctuations, as
the purpose of opening the BOJ’s local representatives. However, “balance interest rates” is not clearly defined. 
62. Other important purposes for local representatives were funds payments and settlement, treasury receipts, and 
disbursements and banknote issuing. 
63. Matsukata wrote his response at the bottom of the BOJ’s application form. 
64. The first application was made on April 19, 1886, but due to inadequate content (lack of branch bylaws) the BOJ
reapplied on June 16. The draft application of April 19 (the actual application is not in the BOJ archives, only the
draft remains) lists eight centers for the establishment of branches or local offices: Nagasaki, Hakodate, Niigata,
Kobe, Yokohama, Akamagaseki (now Shimonoseki), Nagoya, and Sendai. The application notes that they “will
not be established all at the same time” but does not comment specifically on the order of establishment. The
application of June 16 (which remains in the BOJ archives) contains Matsukata’s signature and a note that says,
“Quickly investigate the locations of branch offices and their operational bylaws and submit additionally.” On July 30, 1889, seven years after the drafting of “Explanation of the
Establishment of the Bank of Japan” by Matsukata, a memorandum that was preserved
by Shigeyoshi Matsuo,
65 then the head of the Receipts and Disbursements Bureau of
the MOF, noted that the MOF acknowledged the need to expand the BOJ’s local 
representatives network to facilitate finance. In other words, the primary duty of the
BOJ was, according to the “central bank” heading in this memorandum, “to provide 
a means of funds transfers throughout the country and to facilitate market finance.”
This emphasis on promoting funds transfers
66 was more or less the same as Matsukata
had argued for in the “Proposal to Establish the Bank of Japan,” and the MOF also
comments on the need to establish branches and agencies to achieve these objectives.
67
Table 1 contains an overview of the establishment of branches and local offices
between 1882 and 1909. The Osaka Branch was established in December 1882, virtually
simultaneous with the opening of the Head Office, because of Osaka’s position as a
“center of commerce,”
68 but no other branches were established immediately thereafter.
The first two local offices were in Gifu and Wakayama in 1891
69 and then three were
established in Hokkaido in 1893. The second branch to be established was the Saibu
(Kyushu) Branch,
70 which came in 1893, 10 years after the opening of the Osaka Branch.
Branches and local offices were established at a steady pace thereafter. In 1909, there
were branches and local offices in most of the major financial centers and Hokkaido:
Osaka (1882), Saibu, Sapporo, Hakodate, and Nemuro (1893), Kyoto (1894), Nagoya
and Otaru (1897), Fukushima (1899), Hiroshima (1905), and Kanazawa (1909).
71
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65. Shigeyoshi Matsuo papers; writer unknown; uses MOF stationery. The document explains the functions of the
Yokohama Specie Bank and the BOJ and is entitled “Proposal for the Bank of Japan to Use the Specie Bank as a
Liable Agency to Perform Foreign Exchange Services” (Bank of Japan [1958a, pp. 1441–1453]). 
66. The other duties it lists are “rediscounting and purchasing of commercial bills and promissory bills so as to
enhance the funding of banks, etc.,” “regulating the ebbs and flows of finance and maintaining converged interest
rates,” “discounting foreign funds transfer bills so as to enhance the convenience of domestic and foreign trade,”
and “planning the recovery of specie.” 
67. At the bottom of the page on “providing a means of funds transfers throughout the country and facilitating market
finance,” the MOF notes, “The Bank of Japan is the central bank of Japan and at the center of monetary circula-
tion in the Japanese financial economy. It should open a series of branches, local offices, representative offices, and
agencies around the country so as to communicate and coordinate with financial companies around the country. It
should provide a significant means of funds transfers so as to alleviate the congestion and clogging in finance by
averaging the relative demand for money, for example, allowing a money surplus in one region to be transferred to
serve the financial needs of another region, and a money surplus in the second region to be lent for the financial
needs of the first region.”
68. On October 20, 1882, Vice Governor Tetsunosuke Tomita, acting on behalf of the governor of the BOJ, submitted
an “Application to Establish an Osaka Branch” to Minister of Finance Matsukata (Bank of Japan Institute for
Monetary and Economic Studies Archives, Document A3681). His reasons for needing a branch in Osaka were as
follows: “Osaka is the center of commerce and a major channel for finance in western Japan as Tokyo is in eastern
Japan. Maintaining close contact with Osaka is a key point in the operations of the Bank, and it is considered urgent
that the Bank of Japan establish a branch there.” This application was approved on October 23. 
69. These local offices were established as an emergency measure because Mitsui Bank, which had served as the local
treasury agent, resigned that position. The local offices were closed after a short period of time. 
70. The speech given by an executive director of the BOJ, Morito Yokura, at the opening of the Saibu Branch remains
in the Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives (“Speech at the Opening of the Saibu
Branch” Document A3681). He says, “[T]he Bank ...has a responsibility to facilitate finance around Japan and
enhance the convenience of private enterprise,” but in spite of this, “the circumstances were not right and 
the times were not ripe” for the establishment of branch offices after the opening of the Osaka Branch, but 
“we have begun to reform the Bank’s organization and reorganize its operations so that branches can gradually 
be established around the country.” 
71. When local private-sector banks requested the establishment of a BOJ branch or local office, it was common for
them to emphasize the facilitation of funds transfers with other regions as a main motivation behind the request. 109
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Table 1  Opening of the BOJ’s Branches and Local Offices
End of Total Head Branches Local Places of the BOJ other than the Tokyo Head Office year office offices
1882 2 1 1 Osaka Branch
83 2 1 1
84 2 1 1
85 2 1 1
86 2 1 1
87 2 1 1
88 2 1 1
89 2 1 1
90 2 1 1
91 4 1 1 2 Osaka Branch, Gifu Office, Wakayama Office
92 3 1 1 1 Osaka Branch, Wakayama Office
9 3 7 124 Osaka Branch, Saibu Branch, Sapporo Office, 
Hakodate Office, Nemuro Office, Wakayama Office
Osaka Branch, Saibu Branch, Sapporo Office, 
94 8 1 2 5 Hakodate Office, Nemuro Office, Kyoto Office, 
Wakayama Office
9 5 6 132 Osaka Branch, Saibu Branch, Hokkaido Branch, 
Sapporo Office, Kyoto Office
9 6 6 132
Osaka Branch, Saibu Branch, Hokkaido Branch, 
97 8 1 4 3 Nagoya Branch, Sapporo Office, Kyoto Office, 
Otaru Office
9 8 8 143
Osaka Branch, Saibu Branch, Hokkaido Branch, 
99 9 1 4 4 Nagoya Branch, Sapporo Office, Kyoto Office, 
Otaru Office, Fukushima Office
1900 9 1 4 4
0 1 9 144
0 2 9 144
0 3 9 144
0 4 9 144
Osaka Branch, Saibu Branch, Hokkaido Branch, 
05 10 1 4 5 Nagoya Branch, Sapporo Office, Kyoto Office, 
Otaru Office, Fukushima Office, Hiroshima Office
Osaka Branch, Saibu Branch, Nagoya Branch, 
06 9 1 4 4 Otaru Branch, Kyoto Office, Hakodate Office, 
Fukushima Office, Hiroshima Office
0 7 9 144
0 8 9 144
Osaka Branch, Saibu Branch, Nagoya Branch, 
09 10 1 4 5 Otaru Branch, Kyoto Office, Hakodate Office, 
Fukushima Office, Hiroshima Office, Kanazawa Office
Source: Bank of Japan (1986).
A slightly later example comes from the application for the establishment of a branch in Asahikawa, Hokkaido,
which was filed on November 22, 1921 and submitted to Governor Junnosuke Inoue as a resolution of the 21st
Hokkaido Bankers Conference. The application says that the establishment of a BOJ branch or local office in
Asahikawa would “contribute to the steady growth of Hokkaido, the development and progress of industry and in
particular the development of modern funds transfers . . . it is most urgent for funds transfers to be facilitated so as
to promote the development of industry” (Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives,
Document A3682). Thus for the first decade after its establishment, the BOJ had only two branches, in
Tokyo and Osaka, but by the early 1900s it had 10 offices in seven prefectures. 
2. Differences between the head office, branches, local offices, and representative
offices in transactions with private-sector banks 
Three forms of local BOJ offices existed at the time: branches, local offices, and repre-
sentative offices. Documentary evidence allows us to observe the role that they played
in the integration of financial markets. From my perspective of considering how the
facilitation of remote funds transfers and payments enabled the integration of financial
markets, the most important point is whether these offices provided funds transfer 
services. My information comes from Collection 1, Volume 1 of Manuals and Rules of
the Bank of Japan’s Operations, which describes the operations of the Osaka Branch,
Gifu Local Office, and Wakayama Local Office. According to the records, from the
time the branch and local offices were established, they provided funds transfer services
in addition to receipt and disbursement of banknotes, treasury receipt and disburse-
ment services,
72 and government bond services.
73 In contrast, representative offices 
were head offices and branch offices of private-sector banks that were commissioned
with a part of BOJ services. While much is unknown regarding the details of their
duties and services, the Branch Representative Office Bylaws
74of 1897 authorized them
to perform “treasury services” (receipts, disbursement, and custody services for treasury
funds under the supervision of the BOJ) and “government bond services.”
75,76 One 
can also see that the work of representative offices focused on government bonds and
treasury services
77 from the following documents: notifications of transfer and transfer
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72. The BOJ began to handle treasury services on July 1, 1883. Prior to this time, services were provided by private-
sector banks under commissions from the funds transfer authorities at the MOF. Treasury funds held by the banks
were treated as government deposits that were used for the ordinary operations of the bank (i.e., invested), but
after the BOJ was ordered to handle treasury receipts and deposits in April 1883, private-sector banks, as agencies
of the BOJ, treated treasury funds taken in from the government and public as deposits from the BOJ and were
prohibited from using these funds for their own operations. Article 3 of the Minister of Finance Order concerning
the Handling of Treasury Monies says, “While the Bank of Japan commissions local national banks and private
banks to act as agents in the receipt and payment of treasury monies, they must segregate these monies from other
monies and are prohibited from pooling them for their own business.” (See Manuals and Rules of the Bank of
Japan’s Operations, Collection 1, Volume 4, p. 3.) 
73. The Osaka Branch had a Documents Division, Treasury Division, Discounting Division, and Calculations
Division. The Gifu local office and Wakayama local office had a Treasury Section, Government Treasury Section,
Operations Section, and Documents Section. 
74. Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations, Collection 1, Volume 1, pp. 615–616. 
75. There are also provisions covering representative offices in the Bank of Japan Internal Bylaws that took effect in
1899 (Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations, Collection 1, Volume 1, pp. 361–362), which state
“The head office, branches or local offices may send staff to handle treasury services and public bond services”
(Chapter 8, Part 3, “Representative Offices,” Article 214), and “The expenses of representative offices shall be 
paid by the office with jurisdiction” (Chapter 8, Part 3, “Representative Offices,” Article 217). There were also
“agencies” that served as representatives of the BOJ. Like representative offices, agencies were private-sector banks
commissioned to handle a part of the BOJ’s services. According to the Internal Bylaws, “Agencies may handle all or
a part of treasury services, public bond services, treasury deposit interest payment services, and bill and damaged
convertible banknote exchange services” (Chapter 9, “Agencies” Article 218) and “Agencies shall be paid a set 
commission for their services and shall bear all costs associated therewith ...” (Chapter 9, “Agencies” Article 220).
Note that funds transfer services are not included. The list of agencies found on pp. 569–607 of Collection 1,
Volume 4 of Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations contains Mitsui Bank, Kawasaki Bank, and
Daiichi Kokuritsu Bank. 
76. Some representative offices in Hokkaido were allowed to handle funds transfer services as an exception to the rule
(Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations, Collection 1, Volume 1, p. 603, pp. 608–609, 615–617, 
p. 619). 
77. When transferring services from one consignee to another or from the consignee to the BOJ, the consignee
handed over government bond principal and interest deposits, government bond certificates and interest coupons,items list issued in conjunction with a change of consignees for the clerical processing
at the Fukuchiyama and Ayabe Representative Offices in 1905
78 and also from the
“Representative Office Succession Procedures” that served as general rules and bylaws
(1908).
79 This point is consistent with the fact that representative office transactions 
are not included in the “account for transfer bills handled by the Head Office, 
branch offices, and local offices” listed in the Bank of Japan Business Report
80 during
the Meiji Period. I can therefore conclude that while the Head Office, branch offices,
and local offices played a significant role in the integration of financial markets by 
providing funds transfer services, the role of the representative offices was limited.
81
3. Example of private-sector bank handling: Mitsui Bank 
Now I turn to documents from the private-sector banks to examine how funds trans-
fers were accomplished using the BOJ’s network. The Meiji Period books and ledgers
82
of Mitsui Bank contain evidence of funds transfers made between the bank’s head and
branch offices over the BOJ’s network.
83 The ledgers for 1898 and 1899 (Tokyo Head
Office Ledger of Accounts [1988, material number 143]; Osaka Branch Office Ledger
of Accounts [1899, material number 144]; Kyoto Branch Office Ledger of Accounts
[1899, material number 145]) contain many entries indicating that funds were circu-
lating through BOJ telegraphic transfers.
84 In 1898, the Tokyo Head Office received
funds
85 from Bakan (Shimonoseki), Osaka, Hakodate, and Otaru and made transfers
to Osaka. In 1899, there are entries for transfers
86 to the Osaka Branch from Tokyo,
Kyoto, and Bakan. The Kyoto Branch shows transfers from the Osaka Branch. In all
cases, the transfers were accomplished by using the Head Office, branches, and local
offices (network) of the BOJ. Mitsui Bank provides one example of a bank making use
of the BOJ network at the end of the 1890s.
87
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ledgers, statement of total amount of income tax and official seals, and so on. Details are not known about how
representative offices were selected or the time period for the contract, but documents in the Bank of Japan
Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives do contain a few examples of consignees being changed
(Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives, Documents 7687, 7700). 
78. “Notification of Procedures for the Transfer of Clerical Agency Services for the Fukuchiyama and Ayabe
Representative Offices from Tanba Bank to Hyakusanju Bank (130th Bank)” (Bank of Japan Institute for
Monetary and Economic Studies Archives, Document 7752). 
79. Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations, Collection 1, Volume 9, pp. 64–66. 
80. Bank of Japan (1957, 1958b). 
81. In light of the fact that the final treatment (final payment) for one-sided funds transfers was accomplished either
by sending cash or by offsetting treasury funds, we should point out the need for analysis to focus on the impor-
tant role played by treasury funds in rectifying the geographical bias in funding and bringing about converged
national interest rates. 
82. In the archives of Mitsui Bunko. 
83. According to Mitsui Bunko (1980), the “Reform Order” (1886) was issued when Mitsui Bank resigned its 
handling of government funds. The order calls for the bank to “expand current account deposit-taking services.
When deposits are in excess compared to the demand of funds in that office, allocate one-third to payment reserves
and send the remaining two-thirds to the head or other branch offices” and “facilitate the circulation of private indus-
trial funding with close coordination among head and branch offices.” The presence of these items indicates that
information on financial conditions in different regions was being exchanged and funds may have been moving
between the branch and head offices based on that information (Mitsui Bunko [1980, pp. 344–345]). 
84. Telegraphic transfers involve telegraphing the recipient office regarding the transfer of funds. Katano (1956, 
p. 457) explains that this method of transfer was “fast, simple and easy.”
85. There are also entries for “cash transfers,” which were relatively short (within a city) distance transfers, according to
the documents, from Fukagawa to the Head Office in Tokyo. 
86. There are also several “cash transfer” entries over a short distance that the documents indicate were from Kobe 
and Wakayama.
87. The Mitsui Bank books and ledgers are only available for a limited period. It was not possible to use ledgers from
other periods of time to compare transfers.IV. The Role of the BOJ Network in the Integration 
of Financial Markets 
This section examines how the financial and payments networks, discussed in the 
previous section, served to integrate domestic financial markets in the Meiji Period. 
A. The Integration of Domestic Financial Markets as Shown by Regional 
Interest Rates 
1. The integration of domestic financial markets as seen from the “financial 
status” section of the Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry 
of Finance
The “financial status” section of the Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the
Ministry of Finance contains many entries indicating a lack of financial market 
integration up until the late 1880s. For example, the 10th Annual Report of the
Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (1887) demonstrates that there were still
large regional gaps in interest rates: “Tokyo and Osaka are the national centers of
commerce and their interest rates contain sufficient information to infer general
trends in nationwide finance. However, market conditions are independent for each
region as are relative levels of financial demand, and there are therefore differences in
interest rate levels.”
88
There were also many indications that interest rates were higher in rural regions
than in the urban centers:
89 “The reason that regional interest rates tend to be
extremely high is because regional commerce is generally small in scale and the 
relative accumulation or dispersion of money necessarily has an impact on finance”
(1887);
90 “Traditionally, interest rates in Japan have been lower in the cities and 
higher in the rural areas” (1888);
91 and “Interest rates are always lower in the 
urban areas where there are highly developed financial institutions and higher in 
rural areas that lack these institutions; this is a generally accepted economic 
principle” (1889).
92
However, even in Tokyo and Osaka, which had relatively low interest rates, interest
rate levels differed until the end of the 1880s; Osaka’s interest rates were higher than
Tokyo’s. For example: “Interest rates at Osaka branches are normally high in com-
parison with Tokyo” (1888)
93 and “Many years of observation indicate that interest
rates at Osaka branches are always slightly higher than at Tokyo branches” (1889); see
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88. 10th Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (1887, pp. 45–46). 
89. Okada (1966, pp. 115–149) says that the reason why interest rates were relatively high in outlying areas was that
smaller banks had to compete with larger urban banks for deposits in local markets and therefore were required to
pay high interest rates. These high deposit rates led to higher lending rates. In addition, borrowers were often
ultra-small enterprises or small-scale merchants and the amounts borrowed were tiny in comparison to the loans
made by major urban banks. Interest rates are higher on small-value loans because of the management costs and
risks involved. One of the distinguishing features of regional finance was that conditions were vulnerable to trends
in a single major industry, resulting in large seasonal sways in the demand for funds and financing.
90. 10th Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (1887, pp. 46–47). 
91. 11th Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (1888, p. 59).
92. 12th Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (1889, p. 61). As examples, interest rates in
commercial areas such as Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, and Kanagawa were the lowest in the country. 
93. 11th Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (1888, p. 54). Figures 2 and 3.
94,95 I should also note that around the middle of the 1890s, when 
the BOJ began to expand its regional network, the Annual Report of the Banking
Bureau of the Ministry of Finance ceased to include comments on the regional gaps in
interest rates and indeed contained entries that pointed to the gradual formation of
integrated financial markets. The 18th Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of 
the Ministry of Finance (1894) says, “While there were many events for the financial
markets this year, the markets were fortunately able to overcome them without
upheaval,” and then goes on to note, “This is because financial institutions have come
to be situated as intermediaries as credit transactions have developed. They are able to
take measures as the situation demands so as to successfully coordinate their efforts.”
96
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94. 12th Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (1889, p. 59). 
95. Monthly lending rate data are available for Tokyo and Osaka in the “Collected Japanese Economic Statistics” (the
source is “Financial Reference”). In the first half of the 1880s, there appears to have been little linkage between the
interest rates in the two cities. In coefficients of correlation for Tokyo and Osaka lending rates during the period
from the 1880s through 1909, a general rising trend can be observed, moving from 0.1 in the first half 
of the 1880s (1882–85) to 0.86 in the latter half of the 1880s (1886–90), 0.89 in the first half of the 1890s
(1891–95), 0.90 in the latter half of the 1890s (1896–1900) and remaining high after the turn of the century
(0.94 for the 1900–09 period). The spread between Tokyo and Osaka lending rates also contracted from 2.15 
percentage points on average in 1880 to 0.23 percentage point in 1890. The increased linkage of interest rates 
and the contraction of the spread coincide with the startup of operations at the BOJ Head Office and Osaka
Branch, and it is conceivable that the establishment of the BOJ’s offices in the two centers of Tokyo and Osaka 
helped to alleviate the separation of the two markets. It is also conceivable that the startup of banknote issuing by
the BOJ in 1885 played a role, as this allowed banknotes to be supplied more flexibly. For further information on
the functions of the BOJ Osaka Branch at the time of its establishment, see Bank of Japan (1982, pp. 250–258)
and Tsurumi (1991, pp. 222–287). 
96. 18th Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (1894, p. 43). 














Note: Monthly averages in the tables were used. In cases where monthly averages were
not available, averages were calculated by using the high and low of each month.
Original rates are daily rates that have been converted into annual rates.
Source: Asahi Shimbun (1930), pp. 383–402.The indication was that financial markets were functioning effectively at this time.
Likewise, in the 21st Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance
(1896) it says, “Interest rate trends in different regions are virtually the same,”
97 an
indication that interest rates across regions had indeed become co-moved. 
What can be observed from these comments is that little progress occurred 
regarding the nationwide integration of financial markets during the 1870s, when 
private-sector financial institution networks developed, and during the 1880s, when
the BOJ was putting in place its correspondent networks with private-sector financial
institutions. In contrast, there were indeed advances in integration in the 1890s, when
the BOJ expanded its local representatives’ network.
98
2. The integration of domestic financial markets as shown by prefectural 
interest rates 
Section III examined the documentary evidence to see that the expansion of the BOJ’s
network facilitated funds transfers with remote areas. I will now consider the extent to
which this function helped to achieve the “facilitation of finance” that was advocated
as one of the objectives of establishing the BOJ in “Explanation of the Establishment
of the Bank of Japan” with a quantitative analysis. More specifically, since it is natural
to assume that the smoothing out of funds surpluses and shortfalls between regions
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Figure 3  Averages of Lending Rates (Tokyo/Osaka/Annual)















Note: Monthly averages in the tables were used. In cases where monthly averages were
not available, averages were calculated by using the high and low of each month.
Original rates are daily rates that have been converted into annual rates.
Source: Asahi Shimbun (1930), pp.383–402.
97. 21st Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance (1896, p. 29). 
98. As will be discussed below, the standard deviation and coefficient of variation for prefectural interest rates was
declining as early as 1884 (see Figures 4 and 5). Further study will be required to evaluate the degree of integration
in the financial markets during this period. could alleviate regional differences in interest rates, I can use standard deviation 
and coefficient of variation
99 to measure the differences in lending interest rates on a
prefecture-by-prefecture basis during the period between the 1880s and the 1900s
(Figures 4 and 5). For data, I will use the lending interest rates found in Annual Report
of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance and Collected Japanese Economic
Statistics (Asahi Shimbun [1930]).
100 Yamamura (1970) analyzes the convergence of
interest rates between 1889 and 1925 using lending and deposit rates recorded in the
Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance as found in Bank of
Japan (1957). Yamamura (1970) does not analyze the period prior to 1889 because
the data in Bank of Japan (1957) begin with that year. This paper works from the
foundation laid by Yamamura (1970), but also prepares new data based on the 
lending interest rate commentary in the Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the
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99. Coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the average.
100. The left-side interest rates (1881–89) shown with the dotted line in the figures come from Annual Report of the
Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance; the right-side interest rates (1889–1909) from Collected Japanese
Economic Statistics. I am unable to obtain information on interest rates from 1881 to 1883 from statistical 
documents, but the Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance in its general commentary
includes comments on economic and financial market trends as well as lending interest rates in several regions. 
I have therefore tabulated regional interest rates for the 1881–83 period from the general commentary in the 
4th, 5th, and 6th Annual Reports of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. More specifically, I used 
the regional lending interest rates mentioned in the general commentary to arrive at an arithmetical average 
of prefectural interest rates. This leads to a small sample for the 1881–83 period (26 in 1881, 19 in 1882, and 
14 in 1883). For the 1884–89 period, I use the “Table of Regional Interest-Rate Highs and Lows,” “Table of
Regional Market Interest-Rate Highs and Lows,” “Regional Interest-Rate Market,” “Regional Table of Lending
Interest-Rate Highs and Lows” and “Table of Lending Interest-Rate Highs and Lows” found in the general 


















Standard deviation (right scale)
Sources: Data for 1881–89 (left side of the dotted line) are from Annual Report of the
Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, data for 1889–1909 (right side of
the dotted line) are from Collected Japanese Economic Statistics.Ministry of Finance for the 1881–88 period, enabling us to analyze the financial 
market integration process from an earlier point in time. 
The prefectural interest rate differences are greatest for the first half of the 
1880s, right around the time that the BOJ was established. In 1882, the standard
deviation was 6.36 and the coefficient of variation in 1883 was 0.41, the two peak 
figures for the 1881–1909 period that I analyzed. After those points in time, both 
the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation fell rapidly, reaching 2.31 and
0.17, respectively, in 1884. This downtrend continued until 1889.
101 What I do find is
that both the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation were flat between
1889 and 1893, declined in 1894, rose in 1895, declined in 1896 and then gradually
declined for the rest of the 1890s, although there were some variations within this.
This decline in prefectural interest rate differences backs up what I have seen from the
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Figure 5  Coefficient of Variation of Prefectural Interest Rates







Sources: Data for 1881–89 (left side of the dotted line) are from Annual Report of the
Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, data for 1889–1909 (right side 
of the dotted line) are from Collected Japanese Economic Statistics.
commentary and elsewhere in the Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. For 1884 and
1885, only the high and low rates are available for the first and second halves, so we use the average of the high
and low rates for the second half. For 1886, there are high and low interest rates for the July–December period;
for 1887–89, there are monthly high and low rates, so I use an annual average adjusted for average monthly highs
and arbitrage rates. The right side of the dotted line was created from the “Table of Prefectural Interest Rates” in
Collected Japanese Economic Statistics for 1889 and beyond. The prefectural interest rates in this statistical 
document record only the December, or in some cases the June and the December, values; I use the December
value. Samples differ from year to year, but are generally 42. We should note, however, that a prefecture’s data may
not be tabulated on a continual basis. The source for the “Table of Prefectural Interest Rates” in the Collected
Japanese Economic Statistics is the Imperial Statistics Yearbook (Cabinet Statistics Bureau [various years]).
101. The year 1889 marks the borderline for my data, and as there are two data sources I can see the trend but will
withhold interpretation for the level shift.documentary evidence, that there was progress on the integration of financial markets
in the latter half of the 1890s. 
Figure 6 provides more detail on regional interest rate trends, and it can be seen
that there were differences from region to region in the deviation from the national
average. For example, at the end of the 1880s and in the first half of the 1890s, the
Hokkaido, Tohoku, and Kyushu regions had interest rates higher than the national
average, while the Tokai, Kinki, and Tozan (Yamanashi, Nagano, and Gifu) regions
had lower ones. In the latter half of the 1890s, the deviation from the national average
tended to contract for all regions and interest rate gaps moved in the direction of 
convergence. A certain degree of regional difference remained even after the 1890s.
102
One can also observe the convergence of regional interest rates from the BOJ 
official discount rate.
103 For a while after its establishment, the BOJ did not have a
uniform official discount rate for its offices. Different rates were applied in Tokyo and
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102. This finding is consistent with Asakura (1988) and Okazaki (1993). 
103. At the time it began operations in October 1882, the BOJ had two official discount rates: the local commercial
bill discount rate and the public bond-secured lending rate. For the purposes of this paper, “official discount rate”
refers to the “local commercial bill discount rate.” In this context, “local” refers to a bill that was issued and paid
in the same location. This was therefore the discount rate used by a BOJ office to discount a bill that had been
issued within its territory. We should also note that the term “official discount rate” did not officially begin to be
used by the BOJ until 1919 (see Bank of Japan [1982, p. 242]). 
Figure 6  Regional Averages of Differences between Each Prefecture’s Interest Rate





















Note: Tozan consists of Yamanashi, Nagano, and Gifu Prefectures.
Sources: Data for 1881–89 (left side of the dotted line) are from Annual Report of the
Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, data for 1889–1909 (right side 
of the dotted line) are from the Imperial Statistics Yearbook.Osaka,
104 and also at other offices,
105 until 1906.
106 However, the divergence between
the official discount rates at the Head Office and Osaka Branch (Figure 7) that were
seen in the 1880s had virtually disappeared by the early 1890s. 
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Source: Bank of Japan (1986).
104. Comments on the process of determining the BOJ official discount rate indicate that in the 1880s the Osaka
Branch frequently used different “local commercial bill discount rates” and “public bond-secured lending rates”
than the Head Office. The “Osaka Branch Temporary Bylaws” approved by the Minister of Finance in 1882
restricted the branch from setting its own rates without the permission of the Head Office, but that did not mean
that Osaka merely followed the interest rates charged by the Head Office. Rather, it was able to set bill discount
rates and lending rates that it determined to be appropriate and to request the Head Office to make changes.
There is correspondence beginning about July 1884 between Osaka Branch Manager Yuzo Toyama and BOJ
Governor Shigetoshi Yoshihara and Vice Governor Tetsunosuke Tomita from which can be gauged the process of
changing the official discount rate to adjust for financial demand. Among the correspondence is a disagreement
between the Head Office, which wanted Osaka to raise its official discount rate, and the Osaka Branch, which
was reluctant to do so because it wanted to encourage use of its bill discounting services. While the Osaka Branch
eventually acquiesced, it appears that it did not easily give in to instructions from the Head Office to change its
official discount rate (see Bank of Japan [1982, pp. 250–258]). 
105. The Head Office, Osaka Branch, Hokkaido Branch, Saibu Branch, and Fukushima Local Office all had their
own official discount rates. The Sapporo Local Office and Otaru Local Office used the same rates as the
Hokkaido Branch; the Kyoto Local Office used the same rates as the Osaka Branch; and the Nagoya Branch and
Hiroshima Local Office the same rates as the Head Office (see Bank of Japan [1986, pp. 350–375]). 
106. In 1906, the BOJ reformed its interest rate systems, including the application of a uniform official discount rate
(“Bank of Japan Interest Rates System Reforms”; “Tokyo Bank Report”; “Conversations with Seishiro Kimura,
Director, Operations Department, Bank of Japan; found in Tokyo Banking Association [1957, pp. 1096–1098]).
The main points of these reforms were to (1) eliminate the transfer premium (charged to customers for transfers
between offices); (2) unify interest rates (apply the same interest rates at all offices); and (3) achieve more effective 
usage of interest rates (use the official discount rate as the standard interest rate, but also establish a maximum
interest rate depending upon the type of the loan and apply interest rates between the two). An analysis of the
1906 interest rate system reforms is beyond the scope of this paper. B. The Role Played by the BOJ Network 
1. Existence of local representatives and its impact on local interest rates 
(statistical investigation) 
In this subsection, I examine from a statistical perspective the contribution made by
the expansion of the BOJ network to the contraction of interest rate differences. 
My first step is to identify changes in interest rates before and after the opening of
the BOJ offices. I did this by looking at the nine prefectures in which the BOJ opened
offices between 1882 and 1909, examining two terms before and after the opening of
the office and comparing how the prefectures’ interest rates diverged from the national
average. In eight of the prefectures in which the BOJ opened offices, excluding Osaka,
there was a contraction in interest rate deviation after the office opened compared to
before (Table 2).
107,108 Of this number, Fukuoka, Kyoto, Aichi, and Fukushima
Prefectures showed a significant difference in deviation from the average before and
after the opening of the office. I next compared the deviation from the national 
average interest rate for prefectures that had BOJ offices and prefectures that did not
for the period after 1900, when the number of offices was more or less unchanged
(Table 3). I found that over a 10-year period, in every year except 1909, the deviation
from the average was lower for prefectures that had BOJ offices than for those that did
not. I also confirmed a significant difference in the average of the differences for 
prefectures with and without BOJ offices for the years 1900, 1901, 1903, and 1905. 
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107. We should note that interest rate data is only available for one year prior to the opening of the Tokyo and Osaka
Branches and only one year after the opening of the Kanazawa Local Office (Ishikawa Prefecture). I have also
excluded the Gifu Local Office and Wakayama Local Office, because they did not remain open. 
108. As we will see in the panel analysis that follows, we have reservations about what can be interpreted from these
data, as the deviation between prefectural and national average interest rates was already in an overall contraction
trend during this period. 
Table 2  Differences between the Prefectural Rates Where the BOJ Was Present 
and the National Average
Percentage points, absolute figures
Average of the whole period (1881–1909)
Before After  Year  the
Test for the average of differences
opening of opening of BOJ
of deviation before and after the
the BOJ the BOJ opened
opening of the BOJ (t-test)
Tokyo 2.94 4.61 2.87 1882 —
Osaka 1.49 1.08 1.51 1882 —
Fukuoka 1.46 3.09 0.85 1893 ***
Hokkaido 1.43 1.65 1.36 1893
Kyoto 0.76 1.41 0.48 1894 **
Aichi 2.08 2.59 1.60 1897 ***
Fukushima 0.89 1.13 0.65 1899 *
Hiroshima 1.07 1.15 0.77 1905
Ishikawa 1.62 1.63 1.52 1909 —
Note: Regarding the test, *** stands for 1 percent significance, ** stands for 5 percent significance, 
* stands for 10 percent significance.
Since data of sufficient duration are not available for Tokyo, Osaka, and Ishikawa, the t-test was
not conducted for these three prefectures.
Sources: Data for 1881–89 are from Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance,
data for 1889–1909 are from the Imperial Statistics Yearbook.The next step is to perform a panel estimation for the period 1889–1909, the
period for which interest rate data could be obtained from a single source. For this
estimation, I use the interest rates differences from a national average for 47 prefec-
tures as the dependent variable. Independent variables are the branch dummy that
equals one, where a BOJ office exists, which is set based on office openings as shown
in Table 1 and the number of correspondent contracts between private-sector banks
and the BOJ. (The results are in Table 4.) A one-year lag for “whether a BOJ office
exists or not” is used because new offices were not necessarily opened at the beginning
of the year and the interest rate convergence effects were assumed to be more promi-
nent in the year after the office was opened. Regarding coefficient signs, it is expected
that they will be negative because interest rate deviation should be smaller the greater
the number of BOJ offices and correspondent banks. The results of the estimate with
a single regression indicate that both the coefficients of the branch dummy and the
number of correspondent contracts between private-sector banks and the BOJ had
negative signs and were significant at the 5 percent level. Even the estimation using
two independent variables found negative signs for the coefficients of the branch
dummy and the number of correspondent contracts between private-sector banks and
the BOJ are significant at the 5 percent level. I further refined this estimation by
adding a trend term (coefficient sign assumed to be negative) to take into account 
the convergence of interest rates over time due to enhancements in the transportation
and communications networks during this period. The estimations indicate that the
coefficients of the branch dummy, the number of private-sector correspondent banks,
and the trend term are significant at the 5 percent level, 1 percent level, and 1 percent
level, respectively. 
These results indicate that the local offices of the BOJ and the BOJ correspondent net-
work with private-sector banks can be assumed to have contributed to the convergence
of local interest rates. 
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Table 3  Differences between Prefectural Rates and the National Average during
1900–09
Average of  Average of 
Average of differences between  differences between  Test for differences 
differences between  rates of prefectures  rates of prefectures  of averages of 
prefectural rates and  with the BOJ   without the BOJ  deviation of (A)
the national average presence and the   presence and the  and (B) (t-test)
national average (A) national average (B)
1900 1.218 0.622 1.323 **
01 1.333 0.695 1.444 **
02 1.510 0.806 1.615
03 1.996 1.212 2.133 *
04 1.380 0.795 1.482
05 1.170 0.784 1.249 **
06 1.507 1.075 1.595
07 1.206 1.163 1.215
08 0.940 0.913 0.946
09 1.442 1.463 1.437
Note: For the t-test, ** stands for 5 percent significance, and * stands for 10 percent significance.2. Functions of local representatives: The Saibu Branch 
To this point, I have observed the role over time played by the private-sector bank 
network, correspondent network between the BOJ and private-sector banks, and BOJ
branches and local offices network. Comparing these developments against trends in
prefectural interest rates indicates that the creation of the BOJ network, and particu-
larly the branch and local office network, played a significant role in the integration of
financial markets through the funds transfer services provided. Here I take an individ-
ual case study to examine from the perspectives of funds transfer services and interest
rates the role played by a local BOJ office in the integration of financial markets.
109
Specifically, I examine the functions of the BOJ Saibu Branch. 
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Table 4  Panel Analysis of Differences between Each Prefecture’s Lending Interest 
Rate and the National Average, Existence of a BOJ Branch, and
Correspondent Relationships between the BOJ and Private Banks
Equations (1) Sit = αi + βXit–1 + uit
(2) Sit = αi + Y it + uit
(3) Sit = αi + βXit–1 + Y it +  Tit + uit
Sit = deviation of lending interest rates of each prefecture (differences between each 
prefecture’s rate and the national average; annual, absolute figure)
Xit = branch dummy which equals one, where a BOJ office exists
Y it = the number of correspondent relationships between the BOJ and private banks
Tit = trend
Estimates period 1889–1909
The results of the panel analysis for the 47 prefectures (fixed-effect model)
   R
– 2 DW Number of




BOJ and the 
private banks)
(1) –0.498 —— 0.358 1.264 912
(–2.143)**
(2) —– 0.044 — 0.307 1.254 958
(–2.289)**
(3) –0.563 –0.062 –0.038 0.283 1.304 912
(–2.391)** (–3.343)*** (–5.954)***
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-values. *** and ** indicate that estimations are significant at the 
1 percent and the 5 percent level, respectively.
Test: p-values regarding null hypothesis “acceptance of random effect model” are 0.151 for 
equation (1), 0.010 for equation (2), and 0.013 for equation (3), respectively. Therefore, 
the fixed-effect model was adopted.
Sources: Interest rates of each prefecture are from the Imperial Statistics Yearbook; the number of 
the BOJ’s branches is from Bank of Japan (1986); and the number of the correspondent 
relationships between the BOJ and private banks is based on Manuals and Rules of the 
Bank of Japan’s Operations, Collection 1, Volume 2.
109. For BOJ funds transfers, Tsurumi (1991) uses the period from the latter half of 1883 to the first half of 1888, 
during which time the activities of the transfer clearinghouses declined. His analysis distinguishes between 
government transfers and civil transfers for transfers between BOJ offices and between the BOJ and private-sector
banks (see Tsurumi [1991, pp. 144–151]).The Saibu Branch
110 was opened in 1893, making it the BOJ’s second branch after
Osaka. It was initially established in Akamagaseki (now Shimonoseki) in Yamaguchi
Prefecture, but in 1898 was moved to Moji (now Kitakyushu) in Fukuoka Prefecture.
The major industries in this region were coal mining and rice production, and this
region was known for its active financial dealings with Osaka, which served as the
trade center of such industries (Figure 8).
111
The financial situation in this region prior to the opening of the Saibu Branch is
described as “about ¥10 million a year in rice, coal and other industrial sales outside of
Kyushu with very few commodities sold other than these. In other words, the funds
transfers were always one-sided. Even offsetting payments to the treasury in Kyushu, it
was still necessary to send ¥4–5 million in cash every year from Osaka. Therefore,
interest rates were ¥0.02–0.03 per day higher than Osaka.”
112 The transfer of funds
was not sufficient because transfers of cash were both onerous and risky, and it can 
be assumed that there was insufficient interest rate arbitrage with other regions. By
contrast, after the opening of the Saibu Branch, funds transfers could be made over
the BOJ network, which presumably facilitated the transfer of funds. 
The details of funds transfers can be found in the Bank of Japan Business Report
113
(Table 5). While there were changes over time in the direction of funds inflows and
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Percent
Tokyo Osaka Saibu Others
Source: Bank of Japan Business Report (various issues).
110. The territory of the Saibu Branch at its opening was the Chugoku region of west of Hiroshima and the entire
Kyushu region. See Mukai (2000, p. 990). 
111. Tokyo and Osaka account for the large majority of the total funds transfers of all BOJ offices. 
112. Takahashi (1976, p. 35). Korekiyo Takahashi was the first manager of the Saibu Branch.
113. In Bank of Japan (1957, 1958b). The first Bank of Japan Business Report was issued in 1888. outflows,
114 the volume increased fairly consistently, which indicates that there were
more and more movements of funds over the BOJ network each year. Factors behind
higher inflows include the fact that coal production in Kyushu increased all the way
through the 1887–1906 period,
115 and private-sector banks with nationwide networks
can be assumed to have collected funds from other regions and sent them to Kyushu
to respond to the booming demand for funding in the coal industry.
116 A prime reason
in the increased outflows would be the mergers and acquisitions of smaller coal mines
by the zaibatsu (conglomerates), so that local sales became probably transferred to the
zaibatsu head offices in Osaka or Tokyo. Kasuya (1991) says that by 1902 the Moji
Branch of Mitsui Bank was “receiving enormous sums of funds over the BOJ telegraphic
transfers network from the Head Office and Osaka Branch.”
117,118 Mukai (2000) 
says that “during the Meiji Period, even the zaibatsu-affiliated city banks used the 
BOJ branch and local office network for transfers of funds from the Head Office.”
119
This indicates the important role played by the BOJ network in funds transfers. 
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114. Looking at the regional breakdown of the Saibu Branch’s flow of funds, in most years the Saibu Branch had a
small net inflow of funds vis-à-vis the Head Office, while for Kyoto, Nagoya, and Fukushima (listed in aggregate
as “others” in the table) Saibu had fairly consistent net outflows. By contrast, vis-à-vis the Osaka Branch there
were net inflows until 1895, but this reversed in 1896 and there were large, consistent net outflows thereafter.
115. For example, Sumiya (1968, pp. 220–221, p. 295). 
116. Mukai(1989, p. 50) says, “Supported by expanding markets, the Chikuho region coal industry began to quickly
modernize its quarrying equipment and increase the size of its operations in 1887. The development of the coal
industry required large amounts of operating capital to fund quarrying and transportation and also large amounts
of fixed capital to pay for mining rights, startup costs and mechanical facilities.” 
117. Kasuya (1991, p. 178). 
118. According to the minutes of a branch managers meeting of Mitsui Bank held in November 1905, Kanezuka
Senshiro, the manager of the Moji Branch, spoke on “the reason for the recent sharp falls in interest rates in
Shimonoseki and Moji and the prospects for the future.” He noted that “money is not flowing in to Kyushu from
other regions but flowing out recently to other regions through the BOJ so that the decline in interest rates is not
unreasonable.” In other words, he believed that declining interest rates for the Kyushu region were related to the
relaxation of finance so that funds could be sent to other regions. This statement is an indication that the BOJ
branch office network provided an important vehicle for the transfer of funds between regions at this time (Japan
Business History Institute [1977, p. 153]). 
119. Mukai (2000, p. 966). 
Table 5  Transaction Volume of Money Transfers of the Saibu Branch
¥ thousands
1893 94 95 96 97 98 99 1900 01 02
Inflow Total 406 2,378 2,095 2,618 2,716 2,238 4,441 6,180 7,261 14,906
Tokyo 158 1,073 780 917 884 689 1,636 3,002 4,122 9,612
Osaka 248 1,305 1,315 1,701 1,813 1,533 2,727 3,046 3,060 5,234
Others 0 0 0 0 19 16 78 132 79 60
Outflow Total 72 965 1,018 2,997 5,468 7,434 5,880 12,375 13,790 11,591
Tokyo 0 53 51 182 679 709 1,087 3,133 3,755 2,371
Osaka 72 909 956 2,801 4,736 6,612 4,709 9,023 9,756 9,009
Others 0 2 11 13 53 113 83 219 279 211
Net Total 334 1,413 1,078 –378 –2,752 –5,196 –1,439 –6,195 –6,529 3,315
balance Tokyo 158 1,020 729 735 205 –20 549 –131 367 7,241
(inflow –
Osaka 176 396 359 –1,100 –2,923 –5,079 –1,982 –5,977 –6,696 –3,775 outflow)
Others 0 –2 –11 –13 –34 –97 –6 –86 –200 –151
Source: Bank of Japan Business Report (various issues).As we have seen, more active inflows and outflows of funds through the Saibu
Branch substantially closed the deviation between Fukuoka lending rates and those in
other parts of the country in comparison with before the opening of the Saibu Branch
(Figure 9). Presumably, the Saibu Branch’s facilitation of funds transfers between 
private-sector banks in different regions also enabled greater interest rate arbitrage. 
This subsection has looked at the Saibu Branch as an example of the role that 
BOJ offices played in inter-regional funds adjustments, although further study will be
needed to see how this example fits with developments at other BOJ locations. 
Suffice it to note that “The Bank of Japan and Funds Transfers”
120 found in the Osaka
Bank Report of 1907 (Osaka Banking Association [1957]) provides documentary 
evidence that the flow of funds was substantially smoother in regions that had BOJ
offices than in those that did not. This document says, “The benefits to be enjoyed by
banks when transferring funds depend entirely upon whether they or the counterparty
bank are located in areas where there are Bank of Japan offices.” In other words, 
having a BOJ office benefited the funds transfers of local private-sector financial 
institutions. This document indicates that the expansion of the BOJ network helped
to alleviate the regional funding disadvantage through payments-side funds transfers
between remote regions. 
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Figure 9  Difference in Interest Rates between Fukuoka Prefecture 
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120. Osaka Banking Association (1957, pp. 21–24). Published under the name of Midori Kobayashi.V. Conclusions 
This paper has used documents and data to observe the role played by the BOJ 
network in the process of financial market integration in Meiji Period Japan. I have
demonstrated that regional differences in interest rates contracted in the late 1890s
and, at least from the perspective of interest rates, significant progress had been made
in financial market integration by the latter half of the decade. This is consistent with
the analyses of Tsurumi (1991) and Yamamura (1970). 
I also examined the role that the BOJ played in financial market integration and
found that the BOJ network, and more specifically the correspondent transactions
between the BOJ and private-sector financial institutions and the local BOJ offices,
served to activate inter-regional movements of funds through the funds transfer 
services provided. These analytical findings are consistent with the arguments made
by Tsurumi (1991). 
Nonetheless, some differences still obtained in regional interest rates even after 
the 1890s. One topic for future analysis is a longer-term perspective of the process 
by which financial market integration was deepened after the turn of the century. 
The focus of this paper was on the alleviation of funding disadvantage and interest
rate differences through the facilitation of funds transfers between remote areas. 
Other important points to consider in any analysis of financial market integration
would include the other major services of BOJ offices: credit functions (lending, 
discounting, etc.), issuing of banknotes, and treasury services. These too are topics 
for further study.
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